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Introduction
There is both much optimism and pessimism around artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) today. The optimists are investing mil-
lions of dollars, and even in some cases billions of dollars
into AI. The pessimists, on the other hand, predict that AI
will end many things: jobs, warfare, and even the human
race. Both the optimists and the pessimists often appeal to
the idea of a technological singularity, a point in time where
machine intelligence starts to run away, and a new, more in-
telligent “species” starts to inhabit the earth. If the optimists
are right, this will be a moment that fundamentally changes
our economy and our society. If the pessimists are right, this
will be a moment that also fundamentally changes our econ-
omy and our society. It is therefore very worthwhile spend-
ing some time deciding if either of them might be right.
The History of the Singularity
The idea of a technological singularity can be traced back
to a number of different thinkers. Following John von Neu-
mann’s death in 1957, Stanislaw Ulam wrote:
“One conversation [with John von Neumann] centered
on the ever accelerating progress of technology and
changes in the mode of human life, which gives the ap-
pearance of approaching some essential singularity in
the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as
we know them, could not continue.” (Ulam 1958)
I.J. Good made a more specific prediction in 1965, calling it
an “intelligence explosion” rather than a “singularity”:
“Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a ma-
chine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities
of any man however clever. Since the design of ma-
chines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultrain-
telligent machine could design even better machines;
there would then unquestionably be an intelligence ex-
plosion, and the intelligence of man would be left far
behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last
invention that man need ever make.” (Good 1965)
Many credit the technological singularity to the computer
scientist, and science fiction author Vernor Vinge who pre-
dicted:
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“Within thirty years, we will have the technological
means to create superhuman intelligence. Shortly after,
the human era will be ended.” (Vinge 1993)
More recently, the idea of a technological singularity has
been popularized by Ray Kurzweil (Kurzweil 2006) as well
as others. Based on current trends, Kurzweil predicts the
technological singularity will happen around 2045. For the
purposes of this article, I suppose that the technological sin-
gularity is the point in time at which we build a machine
of sufficient intelligence that is able to redesign itself to im-
prove its intelligence, and at which its intelligence starts to
grow exponentially fast, quickly exceeding human intelli-
gence by orders of magnitude.
I start with two mathematical quibbles. The first quibble
is that the technological singularity is not a mathematical
singularity. The function 1
1−t
has a mathematical singular-
ity at t = 1. This function demonstrates hyperbolic growth.
As t approaches 1, its derivative ceases to be finite and well
defined. Many proponents of a technological singularity ar-
gue only for exponential growth. For exampe, the function 2t
demonstrates exponential growth. Such an exponential func-
tion approaches infinity more slowly, and has a finite deriva-
tive that is always well defined. The second quibble is that
the idea of exponential growth in intelligence depends en-
tirely on the scale used to measure intelligence. If we mea-
sure intelligence in logspace, exponential growth is merely
linear. I will not tackle here head on what we mean by mea-
suring the intelligence of machines (or of humans). I will
simply suppose there is such a property as intelligence, that
it can be measured and compared, and that the technological
singularity is when this measure increases exponentially fast
in an appropriate and reasonable scale.
The possibility of a technological singularity has driven
several commentators to issue dire predictions about the
possible impact of artificial intelligence on the human race.
For instance, in December 2014, Stephen Hawking told the
BBC:
“The development of full artificial intelligence could
spell the end of the human race. . . . It would take off on
its own, and re-design itself at an ever increasing rate.
Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution,
couldn’t compete, and would be superseded. ”
Several other well known figures including Bill Gates, Elon
Musk and Steve Wozniak have subsequently issued similar
warnings. Nick Bostrom has predicted a technological sin-
gularity, and argued that this poses an existential threat to the
human race (Bostrom 2014). In this article, I will explore ar-
guments as to why a technological singularity might not be
close.
Some arguments against the Singularity
The idea of a technological singularity has received more
debate outside the mainstream AI community than within it.
In part, this may be because many of the proponents for such
an event have come from outside this community. The tech-
nological singularity also has become associated with some
somewhat challenging ideas like life extension and transhu-
manism. This is unfortunate as it has distracted debate from
a fundamental and important issue: will we able to develop
machines that at some point are able to improve their intel-
ligence exponentially fast and that quickly far exceed our
own human intelligence? This might not seem a particularly
wild idea. The field of computing has profited considerably
from exponential trends. Moore’s Law has predicted with
reasonable accuracy that the number of transistors on an in-
tegrated circuit (and hence the amount of memory in a chip)
will double every two years since 1975. And Koomeys law
has accurately predicted that the number of computations
per joule of energy dissipated will double every 19 months
since the 1950s. Is it unreasonable to suppose AI will also at
some point witness exponential growth?
The thesis put forwards here is that there are several
strong arguments against the possibility of a technological
singularity. Let me be precise. I am not predicting that AI
will fail to achieve super-human intelligence. Like many of
my colleagues working in AI, I predict we are just 30 or 40
years away from this event. However, I am suggesting that
there will not be the run away exponential growth predicted
by some. I will put forwards multiple arguments why a tech-
nological singularity is improbable.
These are not the only arguments against a technologi-
cal singularity. We can, for instance, also inherit all the ar-
guments raised against artificial intelligence itself. Hence,
there are also the nine common objections considered by
Alan Turing in his seminal Mind paper (Turing 1963) like
machines not being conscious, or not being creative. I focus
here though on arguments which go to the idea of an expo-
nential run away in intelligence.
The “Fast Thinking Dog” argument
One of the arguments put forwards by proponents of
the technological singularity is that silicon has a signifi-
ciant speed advantage over our brain’s wetware, and this
advantage doubles every two years or so according to
Moore’s Law. Unfortunately speed along does not bring in-
creased intelligence. To adapt an idea from Vernor Vinge
(Vinge 1993), a faster thinking dog is still unlikely to play
chess. Steven Pinker put this argument eloquently:
“There is not the slightest reason to believe in a coming
singularity. The fact that you can visualize a future in
your imagination is not evidence that it is likely or even
possible. Look at domed cities, jet-pack commuting,
underwater cities, mile-high buildings, and nuclear-
powered automobilesall staples of futuristic fantasies
when I was a child that have never arrived. Sheer pro-
cessing power is not a pixie dust that magically solves
all your problems.” (Pinker 2008)
Intelligence is much more than thinking faster or longer
about a problem than someone else. Of course, Moore’s Law
has certainly helped AI. We now learn off bigger data sets.
We now learn quicker. Faster computers will certainly help
us build artificial intelligence. But, at least for humans, intel-
ligence depends on many other things including many years
of experience and training. It is not at all clear that we can
short circuit this in silicon simply by increasing the clock
speed.
The “Anthropcentric” argument
Many descriptions of the technological singularity supposes
human intelligence is some special point to pass, some sort
of “tipping” point. For instance, Nick Bostrom writes:
“Human-level artificial intelligence leads quickly to
greater-than-human-level artificial intelligence. . . . The
interval during which the machines and humans are
roughly matched will likely be brief. Shortly thereafter,
humans will be unable to compete intellectually with
artificial minds.” (Bostrom 2002)
Human intelligence is one point on a wide spectrum that
takes us from cockroach through mouse to human. Actually,
it might be better to say it is a probability distribution rather
than a single point. It is not clear in arguments like the above
which level of human intelligence requires to be exceeded
before run away growth kicks in. Is it some sort of average
intelligence? Or the intelligence of the smartest human ever?
If there is one thing that we should have learnt from the
history of science, it is that we are not as special as we would
like to believe. Copernicus taught us that the universe did not
revolve around the earth. Darwin taught us that we were little
different from the apes. And artificial intelligence will likely
teach us that human intelligence is itself nothing special.
There is no reason therefore to suppose that human intelli-
gence is some special tipping point, that once passed allows
for rapid increases in intelligence. Of course, this doesn’t
preclude there being some level of intelligence which is a
tipping point.
One argument put forwards by proponents of a technolog-
ical singularity is that human intelligence is indeed a special
point to pass because we are unique in being able to build
artefacts that amplify our intellectual abilities. We are the
only creatures on the planet with sufficient intelligence to
design new intelligence, and this new intelligence will not
be limited by the slow process of reproduction and evolu-
tion. However, this sort of argument supposes its conclusion.
It assumes that human intelligence is enough to design an ar-
tificial intelligence that is the sufficiently intelligent to be the
starting point for a technological singularity. In other words,
it assumes we have enough intelligence to initiate the tech-
nological singularity, the very conclusion we are trying to
draw. We may or may not have enough intelligence to be
able to design such artificial intelligence. It is far from in-
evitable. Even if have enough intelligence to design super-
human artificial intelligence, this super-human artificial in-
telligence may not be adequate to percipitate a technological
singularity.
The “Meta-intelligence” argument
One of the strongest arguments against the idea of a techno-
logical singularity in my view is that it confuses intelligence
to do a task with the capability to improve your intelligence
to do a task. David Chalmers, in an otherwise careful analy-
sis of the idea of a technological singularity, writes:
“If we produce an AI by machine learning, it is likely
that soon after we will be able to improve the learning
algorithm and extend the learning process, leading to
AI+” (Chalmers 2010)
Here, AI is a system with human level intelligence and AI+
is a system more intelligent than the most intelligent human.
But why should it be likely that soon after we can improve
the learning algorithm? Progress in machine learning algo-
rithms has neither been especially rapid or easy. Machine
learning is indeed likely to be a significant component of
any human level AI system that we might build in the future
if only because it will be painful to hand code its knowl-
edge and expertise otherwise. Suppose an AI system uses
machine learning to improve its performance at some tasks
requiring intelligence like understanding a text, or proving
mathematical identities. There is no reason that the system
can in addition improve the fundamental machine learning
algorithm used to do this. Machine learning algorithms fre-
quently top out a particular task, and no amount of tweaking,
be it feature engineering or parameter tuning, appears able
to improve their performance.
We are currently seeing impressive advances in AI us-
ing deep learning (Edwards 2015). This has dramatically im-
proved the state-of-the-art in speech recognition, computer
vision, natural language processing and a number of other
domains. These improvements have come largely from us-
ing larger data sets, and deeper neural networks:
“”Before, neural networks were not breaking records
for recognizing continuous speech; they were not big
enough.” Yann LeCun, quoted in (Edwards 2015)
Of coures, more data and bigger neural networks means we
need more processing power. As a result, GPUs are now fre-
quently used to provide this processing power. However, be-
ing better able to recognize speech or identify objects has
not lead to an improvement in deep learning itself. The deep
learning algorithms have not improved themselves. Any im-
provements to the deep learning algorithms have been hard
won by applying our own intelligence to their design.
We can come at this argument from another direction us-
ing one of the best examples we know of intelligent systems.
Look at ourselves. We only use a fraction of the capabilities
of our amazing brains, and we struggle to change this. It is
much easier for us to learn how to do better at a particular
task, than it is for us to learn how to learn better in general.
For instance, if we remove the normalization inherent in the
definition of IQ, we can observe that IQ has increased over
the last century but only slowly (the “Flynn effect”). And
improving your IQ today is pretty much as slow and painful
as it was a century ago. Perhaps electronic brains will also
struggle to improve their performance quickly and never get
beyond a fraction of their fundamental capabilities?
The “Diminishing returns” argument
The idea of a technological singularity typically supposes
improvements to intelligence will be a relative constant mul-
tiplier, each generation getting some fraction better that the
last. However, the performance so far of most of our AI sys-
tems has been that of diminishing returns. There is often
lots of low hanging fruit at the start, but we then run into
great difficulties to improve after this. This helps explain the
overly optimistic claims made by many of the early AI re-
searchers. An AI system may be able to improve itself an
infinite number of times, but the extent to which its intel-
ligence changes overall could be bounded. For instance, if
each generation only improves by half the last change, then
the system will never get beyond doubling its overall intelli-
gence.
Diminishing returns may also come not from the difficulty
of improving our AI algorithms, but from the difficulty of
their subject matter increasing rapidly. Paul Allen, the Mi-
crosoft co-founder calls this the “complexity brake”.
“We call this issue the complexity brake. As we go
deeper and deeper in our understanding of natural
systems, we typically find that we require more and
more specialized knowledge to characterize them, and
we are forced to continuously expand our scientific
theories in more and more complex ways . . . we be-
lieve that progress toward this understanding [of cogni-
tion] is fundamentally slowed by the complexity brake.”
(Allen and Greaves 2011)
Even if we see continual, perhaps even exponential improve-
ments in our AI systems, this may not be enough to improve
performance. The difficulty of the problems required to be
solved to see intelligence increase may themselves increase
even more rapidly. There are those that argue theoretical
physics appears to be running into such complexity brakes.
The “Limits of intelligence” argument
There are many fundamental limits within the universe.
Some of these are physical. You cannot accelerate past the
speed of light. You cannot know both position and momen-
tum with complete accuracy. You cannot know when the ra-
dioactive decay of an atom will happen with certainty. Any
thinking machine that we might build will be limited by
these physical laws. Of course, if that machine is electronic
or even quantum in nature, these limits are likely to be much
greater than the biological and chemical limits of our human
brains.
There are also more empirical laws which can be observed
emerging out of complex systems. For example, Dunbar’s
number is the observed correlation between brain size for
primates and average social group size. This puts a limit of
between 100 and 250 stable relationships on human social
groups. Intelligence is also a complex phenomenon and may
also have such limits which emerge from this complexity.
Any improvements in machine intelligence, whether it runs
away or happens more slowly, may run into such limits. Or
course, there is no reason to suppose that our own human
intelligence is at or close to this limit. But equally, there’s
little reason why any such limits are necessarily far beyond
our own intelligence.
The “Computational complexity” argument
Suppose we stick to building AI systems with computers that
obey our traditional models of computation. Even exponen-
tial improvements are no match for computational complex-
ity. For instance, exponential growth in performance is inad-
equate to run super-exponential algorithms. And no amount
of growth in performance will make undecidable problems
decidable. Computational complexity may be one of the fun-
damental limits discussed in the previous argument. Hence,
unless we use machines that beyond our traditional models
of computation, we are likely to bump into many problems
where computational complexity fundamentally limits per-
formance. Of course, a lot of computational complexity is
about worst case, and much of AI is about using heuristics
to solve problems in practice that are computationally in-
tractable in the worst case. There are, however, fundamental
limits to the quality of these heuristics. There will be classes
of problems that even a super-human intelligence cannot
solve well, even approximately.
Conclusions
I have argued that there are many reasons why we might
never witness a technological signularity. Nevertheless, even
without a technological singularity, we might still end up
with machines that exhibit super-human levels of intelli-
gence. We might just have to program much of this painfully
ourselves. If this is the case, the impact of AI on our econ-
omy, and on our society may be less dramatic than either the
pessimists or the optimists have predicted. Nevertheless, we
should start planning for the impact that AI will have on so-
ciety. Even without a technological singularity, AI is likely
to have a large impact on the nature of work. As a second
example, even quite limited AI is likely to have a large im-
pact on the nature of war. We need to start planning today
for this future.
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